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This paper discusses two proposals to the US President’s
Council on Bioethics that try to overcome the issue of killing
embryos in embryonic stem (ES) cell research and argues
that neither of them can hold good as a compromise
solution. The author argues that (1) the groups of people
for which the compromises are intended neither need nor
want the two compromises, (2) the US government and
other governments of countries with restrictive regulation
on ES cell research have not provided a clear and sound
justification to take into account minority views on the
protection of human life to such a considerable extent as to
constrain the freedom of research in the area of stem cell
research, and (3) the best way to deal with these issues is to
accept that many people and most governments adopt a
gradualist and variable viewpoint on the human embryo
which implies that embryos can be sacrificed for good
reasons and to try to find other, less constraining, ways to
take into account minority views on the embryo. Finally,
another more efficient and time and money sparing
compromise will be proposed for those who accept IVF, a
majority in most societies.
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STEM CELL RESEARCH
Stem cells are widely believed to represent one of
the greatest promises for medicine and biomedi-
cal research in the coming century with hopes
raised for treatments for common diseases and
conditions, including neurological disease or
injury, diabetes, and myocardial infarct. At
present there are three main lines of stem cell
research, namely on stem cells originating from
early in vitro embryos, left over from infertility
treatment, or especially created for research
through in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or cell nuclear
transfer (CNT) (embryonic stem (ES) cells), on
cord blood derived stem cells, and on stem cells
from more developed tissues or organs from
foetuses or organisms after birth (adult stem
cells). There is a growing consensus among
scientists worldwide that all these lines of
research are promising because the different
types of stem cells may have different qualities
and might be useful for different purposes. So
rather than opting for one line of research, the
ideal research strategy would be to simulta-
neously proceed with research on all types of
stem cells.1–3
However, embryonic stem cell research which
involves the destruction of the embryo is opposed
by those who regard the embryo as in some
important sense ‘‘one of us’’.
For those who take this view, the embryo
should never be used as a mere means, even if
this could save millions of lives.4 They advocate
the legal prohibition of stem cell research that
involves the ‘‘killing’’ of human embryos.
THE STEM CELL DEBATE
The debate over the ethics of different types of
stem cell research has quite unprecedented
importance. Not only because stem cell research
will have an enormous impact on almost all
aspects of medicine, nor because the stem cell
debate combines many of the most contentious
biomedical issues ever discussed. What makes
this debate both unprecedented and so interest-
ing is that—compared with other areas of
debate, including abortion and assisted repro-
duction techniques (ART)—stem cell research is
of great interest to a much larger section of
society. Everyone may potentially benefit from
the fruits of stem cell research: all citizens who
can become patients in need of treatments based
on stem cell research, the research community,
the pharmaceutical industry, politicians, and
voting and tax paying citizens. All of us are
stakeholders in stem cell research.
This has remarkable consequences for the
course of the debate. Most people, and most
governments, opt for an intermediate position
and do not want to block ES cell research, but
want at least some research to proceed. (In
Europe, Austria, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway,
Portugal and Slovakia are the only countries
that prohibit all ES cell research. Austria does not
explicitly prohibit the import of ES cells.
Germany and Italy prohibit the procurement of
ES cells but allow the importation of ES cells.5)
Probably never before in medical ethics have
governments been so creative in finding such a
variety of compromise positions. Some countries,
for example, believe to have found a compromise
solution in making a moral distinction between
the use of ES cells for research and their
derivation, a process considered immoral because
it involves the ‘‘killing’’ of embryos. Other
countries legalise the use of leftover IVF embryos
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for research, but not of embryos created solely for research
purposes. And in both intermediate positions we find
variations, for example, restricting the use of ES cells to
those derived before a set date in order to avoid moral
complicity with the derivation process.
However, these compromises have satisfied few people.
Neither those who think the embryo can be used for
important research, nor those who think the embryo is one
of us and should never be used merely as a means in research
and therapy can accept the situation and they are lobbying to
change regulations.6
The most controversial ethical questions concerning the
use of ES cells would be bypassed if it became technically
possible to produce cells equivalent to ES cells, without
killing human embryos. This has involved science in medical
ethics in a different way: science has engaged itself in trying
to solve the moral dilemma in ES cell research. There have
been various proposals for possible techniques of harvesting
ES cells without instrumentalising human embryos, most of
which I will below. Last December, two new proposals
presented to the US President’s Council on Bioethics became
the subject of discussion and offered new hope to find a way
out of the moral dispute on ES cell research.7
This paper discusses these two proposals and argues that
neither of them can hold good as a compromise solution. I
will argue that (1) the groups of people for which the
compromises are intended neither need nor want the two
compromises, (2) the US government, and other govern-
ments of countries with restrictive regulation on ES cell
research, have not provided a clear and sound justification to
take into account minority views on the protection of human
life to such a considerable extent as to constrain the freedom
of research in the area of stem cell research, and (3) the best
way to deal with these issues is to accept that many people
and most governments adopt a gradualist and variable
viewpoint on the human embryo which implies that embryos
can be sacrificed for good reasons and to try to find other, less
constraining, ways to take into account minority views on the
embryo. Finally, another more efficient and time and money
sparing compromise will be proposed for those who accept
IVF, a majority in most societies.
TWO PROPOSALS: A WAY OUT OF THE MORAL
DILEMMA?
Organismically dead embryos
A first compromise solution was proposed by Dr Howard
Zucker and Dr Don Landry, both from the College of
Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University in New
York.8 Their proposal involves the possibility of deriving ES
cells from no longer living embryos. They see ‘‘death’’ as the
common ground for disagreements about when a human
being is a person because, as they say, ‘‘the death of the
human being subsumes the death of the human person and
so whatever disagreements about the origin of a new person,
with the death of a new human being that issue of person is
also resolved’’. They propose considering an embryo as dead
when its cells have irreversibly stopped dividing, which is
comparable with the standard definition of death, namely the
complete irreversible loss of integral organic functioning. In
both cases the human being is what they call ‘‘organismically
dead’’, but not ‘‘thoroughly dead’’, which implies that their
organs or stem cells are still alive and, in most cases, can still
be harvested. According to Landry and Zucker, the procedure
of harvesting stem cells from an organismically dead embryo
can be compared with the donation of vital organs from a
brain dead individual with consent of the next kin, which is
accepted in most societies. The idea is that this application
could offer a framework for ES cell research that at the same
time maintains respect for human dignity and can advance
biomedical research.
To consider the Landry-Zucker proposal, we should first
ask ourselves for which group of people this compromise
solution is intended? As we know that if this procedure were
to become widespread, the principal source of these
organismically dead embryos would be embryos left over
from infertility treatments,7 we can conclude that it is meant
for a group of people that already accepts IVF but that does
not accept the use of living leftover IVF embryos for stem cell
research. These people think that the fact that an embryo has
no chance to develop or is destined to be discarded anyway,
does not justify the killing of that embryo because they
believe there is a relevant moral difference between the lack
of chance to develop and the deliberate killing of those who
are ‘‘one of us’’ for the purpose of research. The latter is
considered as instrumentalisation of human life, which,
according to some, violates human dignity.9 Some compare it
with the harvesting of vital organs from a terminally ill
patient or from a prisoner sentenced to death without that
person’s consent.10
Does the Landry-Zucker compromise overcome these
objections to ES cell research? On first sight, the answer
seems to be yes. The embryo is not killed for the purpose of
research, so there is no question of instrumentalisation.
However, we need to look not only to what people say that
they believe—their ‘‘professed’’ beliefs—but also to what
may be their actual beliefs revealed through their actions. As
the organismically dead embryos would be embryos left over
from fertility treatments, the people for whom the compro-
mise is meant must accept IVF. IVF is a practice in which
embryos are exposed to high risks. Embryo sparing techni-
ques are rarely used and the freezing procedure subjects
embryos of good quality to a high risk of destruction.11
Moreover, IVF involves the deliberate creation of spare
embryos that will die and countries where IVF is common
practice do not put effort into promoting embryo adoption for
couples in need of donor embryos, a practice which is even
forbidden in some countries that allow IVF. Consequently,
we can say that IVF entails the deliberate creation and
sacrifice of embryos for the benefit of infertile couples. If
people accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos to help
infertile people, why would they not accept the creation and
sacrifice of embryos for the benefit of thousands of people
who could be helped by stem cell treatments? I have argued
elsewhere that they would not have a good reason.12 13
If we take these implications of accepting IVF into
consideration it seems that the Landry-Zucker proposal is a
redundant compromise in the sense that it is meant for a
group that already accepts IVF, and thus the creation and
sacrifice of embryos for the benefit of infertile people. If they
accept the sacrifice of embryos for the benefit of infertile
people, they have no good reason to oppose the use of living
left over IVF embryos for the benefit of people in need of
therapies based on stem cell research.
ANTities
The second compromise proposal to the President’s Council
on Bioethics (PCBE) came from council member William
Hurlbut, consulting professor in medical biology at Stanford
University and opponent of embryo research. His proposal
involves the harvesting of stem cells not from dead embryos,
but from what he has called ‘‘embryoid-like entities’’ that
were never alive as embryos in the first place. He proposes to
produce these entities through what he calls ‘‘altered nuclear
transfer’’ (ANT), which involves the genetic alteration of the
donor cell so that, when introduced into an enucleated egg,
the resulting entity starts dividing but lacks the capacity to
develop into an embryo. The idea is that destroying such
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entities to harvest stem cells does not raise moral concerns,
because they are not embryos. Hurlbut stresses that the
crucial feature of this proposal is the ‘‘pre-emptive nature’’ of
the intervention—the genetic alteration is done right from
the start, that is, before an embryo comes into being.
Again a useful question is: for whom has this proposal
been developed? The proposal aims to satisfy those people
who oppose the killing of human embryos, whether for
research purposes or for IVF. In their opinion, killing an
embryo is like killing an innocent person and cannot be
justified by any allegedly desirable consequences. This is the
official viewpoint of the Roman Catholic Church and is
shared by many pro-life and anti-abortion movements.
Does the Hurlbut proposal overcome their objections? A
first impression is (again) yes; no embryos are killed.
However, a question that arises is whether the entity
resulting from ANT—I have called it an ANTity—is actually
an embryo or not.
During the PCBE meeting it was asked whether we would
not be simply creating disabled embryos programmed for an
early death. Suppose if you could, through some technique,
produce an entity which had the capacity to implant but
would absolutely not develop beyond eight weeks; would
that procedure differ from Hurlbut’s proposal? Would we not
in both cases be talking about an entity that appears to be
growing normally but lacks the capacity to continue that
development beyond a certain point? Richard Doerflinger,
from the US Catholic Bishops, stated that it is not enough to
say the genetic defect was introduced into the genome from
the very beginning, because: ‘‘any adult developing
Huntington at the age of 40 had the genetic defect ab initio’’.
It also matters what development has taken place in the
meantime.
From the discussion during the PCBE meeting we can
conclude that doubts are raised about the moral status of
ANTities. But Hurlbut is enthusiastic and writes that: ‘‘this
proposal shifts the ethical debate from the question of when a
normal embryo is a human being with moral worth, to the
more fundamental question of what component parts and
organized structure constitute the minimal criteria for
considering an entity a human organism.’’14 It is doubtful
whether the last question will be more easily answered than
the former.
Let us go deeper into the issue of ‘‘what component parts
and organized structure constitute the minimal criteria for
considering an entity a human organism’’.
Hurlbut sees an embryo as ‘‘an engaged and effective
potential-in-process’’. He says that ‘‘in both constitution and
conduct, the zygote and all subsequent embryonic stages
differ from any other cell or tissues of the body because they
contain within themselves the organizing principle for the
self-development and self-maintenance of the full human
organism’’. Hurlbut seems to place the value of a human
organism on its potential for further development as well as
on structure, more specifically, on the current state of
development and proximity to the human form. According
to Hurlbut, an ANTity is not an embryo but a ‘‘limited cellular
system that is biologically and morally akin to a complex
tissue culture’’. He compares it with creating parts of the
whole and says that an ANTity will never rise to ‘‘the level of
integrated organismal existence essential to be designated
human life with potential’’. Therefore the harvesting of stem
cells of ANTities should not present an ethical problem for
those opposing embryo research.7 14
First of all, we have to ask ourselves what the concepts
‘‘level of integrated organismal existence’’, ‘‘a self-sustaining
and harmonious whole’’, and so forth actually mean. As
Melton et al noted, the concepts Hurlbut uses are not well
defined and have no clear biological meaning.15
Let us apply these terms to entities we already know and
have tried to define in the past.
Defective embryos in sexual reproduction
A first example of ‘‘partial generative potential’’ and to which
Hurlbut refers to in his paper are defective embryos in sexual
reproduction, that is those who are spontaneously aborted
due to either genetic (such as abnormal chromosome
complements) or epigenetic (such as defects in imprinting)
defects. Hurlbut argues that ANT proposes the artificial
construction of such cellular system mimicking these natural
examples.
Parthenotes
What about parthenotes—cleaving eggs activated without
being fertilised by sperm and that did not undergo meiotic
reduction? Hipp and Atala argue that: ‘‘since a parthenote is
analogous to a mature ovarian teratoma […] the de facto
acceptance of experiments using teratoma tumor tissue lends
some legitimacy to experimentation on parthenotes’’.16
Kiessling and Anderson argue that primate parthenotes
undergo developmental arrest in utero and are therefore not
really embryos.17 Hurlbut shares these opinions. The fact that
parthenotes could possibly develop to the morulae stage and
possibly to the blastocyst stage 18 seems not to change his
opinion. However, according to De Wert and Mummery
parthenogenesis is not an ‘‘embryo saving’’ strategy because
parthenotes undergo the first divisions normally. They regard
a parthenote as a ‘‘non-viable embryo’’.19 A representative of
a UK pro-life group said that ‘‘human eggs have ‘the
potential for life’ —and fertilised ones certainly do.
Fertilising them in a different way, or waiting for the embryo
to lose its viability, may make you feel better about not
‘killing’ it, but it is as much a tampering with life as embryo
research is’’.20 This comment would also apply to ANTities.
Chimaeras of human nuclear material and animal
oocytes
In 1998, ACT announced that it had transferred nuclei from
human somatic cells into enucleated bovine oocytes to form
what they called a ‘‘pre-embryo’’ that, in theory, could have
served as a source of ES cells.21 Doerflinger’s reaction at that
time was that the relevant question is whether the resulting
hybrid cell begins, even for a brief time, to grow and develop
as an early human life form and that if this is the case, then
this technique requires creation and destruction of human
embryos.22 De Wert and Mummery, again, do not see this as
an embryo-saving technique. They consider a human-animal
chimera as a human embryo because the entire nuclear DNA
is human,19 which would also be the case with ANTities.
Ferti lised eggs in the pronuclei stage
Germany allows the cryopreservation of fertilised eggs only in
the pronuclei stage. The argument is that an embryo is not
formed before the fusion of sperm and egg pronuclei, which
restores the numbers of chromosomes that is typical for a
human being. The fact that the cell is diploid can be an
important criterion for moral status. In the US, the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for fiscal year 1999, the term ‘‘human embryo’’ included:
‘‘any organism … that is derived by fertilization, partheno-
genesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more
human gametes or human diploid cells’’.23 An ANTity would
be diploid, and may belong to the class of entities defined as
‘‘any organism derived by cloning’’.
Defective eggs activated through CNT
In 1999, Lanza et al stated that ethical controversy over ES cell
research could be avoided because it may eventually be
possible to modify the genome of the patient’s cells before the
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nuclear transfer procedure, so that after ‘‘reprogrammation’’,
the clones develop only into groups of specialised cells and
tissues, rather than into a whole organism. For example, only
into one or two embryonic germ layers.24 This proposal closely
resembles Hurlbut’s proposal. However, it may suggest that
the moral status of a human entity depends on whether it can
develop into one or two, or all three embryonic germ layers.
However, mature teratomas can generate all three primary
embryonic germ cell types as well as more advanced cells and
tissues. And, as Hurlbut said about teratomas during the
council’s meeting: ‘‘these chaotic disorganized and non-
functional masses lack entirely the structural and dynamic
character of organisms’’.7
Defective embryos created through genetic
modification of ES cells
More than five years ago, Alan Trounson proposed the
genetic modification of an embryo so that it can never form a
placenta by inserting trophoblast inhibitor genes into, or to
knock out genes from, early embryonic cells so that these
cells could never form a placenta. These cells would be
changed from totipotent to pluripotent cells.25 Is this creating
handicapped embryos or creating cellular structures similar
to teratomas?
‘‘Normal’’ embryos
Blastocysts created in vitro are ‘‘partial generative potential’’,
but become disorganised structure when not embedded in
the appropriate environment, and lose the organisational
requirements to be designated human life with potential.
The difference between embryos, entities, and
ANTities
This sample of opinions on entities, embryos, and ANTities
may be sufficient to illustrate the difficulties in resolving the
question: what makes the difference between a cellular
system, an embryo. and a human being? Hurlbut’s criteria for
considering an entity as a human embryo are unclear and not
well defined. Even if an answer will be based on specific
biological processes, ultimately it will still be based on
normative value judgments. Of course science can influence
these judgments. As Doerflinger writes ‘‘the early embryo
was once dismissed as a mass of interchangeable and
undifferentiated cells […] and largely formless until the
appearance of the ‘‘primitive streak’’ at around fourteen days
(hence without special orientation)’’ [my emphasis] and ‘‘in the
eighties many Catholic thinkers, on the basis of what scientists
then said, believed there was a qualitative difference between
the embryo less than 14 years old, which was then called a
‘‘pre-embryo’’, and all subsequent stages of development’’
[my emphasis].26 There has been a tendency to try to change
people’s understanding of the experimental subject of
embryo research. Hurlbut’s proposal seems to be another
attempt. The critique has been expressed that it is a semantic
issue and not a scientific one.20 Could it be that some
opponents of the instrumentalisation of embryos slightly
change their ethical viewpoints with regard to prenatal stages
of human organisms because of the specific demands and the
promising prospects of the actual research direction and hope
science can provide the right and ‘‘objective’’ justification?
Science alone will not resolve this moral dilemma. This is
also illustrated by the fact that the uncertainty about the
moral status of the previously mentioned range of entities
has led many people to accord the benefit of doubt to
embryo-like entities, and to protect them as if they were
persons. In reaction on the first human-rabbit embryos
created in China an opponent of embryo research said: ‘‘I
would be wary of immediately assigning chimeras to such a
sub-human status. Perhaps chimeras would be grossly
deformed, or would somehow lack ‘‘normal’’ human
capacities, but they are created from human beings by
human beings, and we should probably accord them the
benefit of doubt in treating as human beings.’’27
MINORITY VIEWS AND POLICY MAKING
Hurlbut intended to focus on the issue of overcoming the
objection of people who care for full protection for embryos.
However, it is worth mentioning that there may be some
other concerns that cause some people to oppose this
proposal, including the genetic manipulation of human life
(ANT involves interference with the cell nucleus which
contains most of the genome) and the slippery slope to
human reproductive cloning. It is astonishing that the US
Council on Bioethics is so enthusiastic about the Hurlbut
proposal, which is based on the nuclear transfer technique.
After all, much of the US policy on therapeutic cloning is
determined by the fear of a slippery slope to human
reproductive cloning.28–30 This fear has apparently disappeared
like snow in summer, since none of the council members
explicitly mentioned it during the meeting. Other concerns
are the commodification and commercialisation of human
body parts, and the need for eggs and the potential of
exploiting women. It would have been an interesting
challenge for Hurlbut to address this latter issue. After all,
the alternative sources of eggs scientists are investigating
raise issues which are very contentious to those opposing
embryo research. (immature eggs from aborted foetuses,
human-animal chimaeras, eggs obtained through an egg
sharing programme, which requires IVF, and eggs derived
from ES cells.31
On the question why science should accommodate the
fundamental views of a small number of people, the answer
usually is that a democracy has to take into account minority
views. But why should governments not take into account
the minority views on the contentious issues the Hurlbut
proposal does not overcome? One answer could be that
minority views about the latter do not concern ‘‘the most
fundamental issue’’, namely the protection of human life,
whereas the moral objection Hurlbut tries to overcome does
concern this question. However, if governments are serious
about this, why do they then not take into account the views
about the protection of human life of those who oppose
termination of pregnancy, or contraception that prevents
fertilised ova to implant in the womb, and how about those
who oppose IVF because it sacrifices those who are one of us?
If Hurlbut’s compromise position is developed to accommo-
date minority views on the protection of human life, there
should at least be a good reason as to why these people’s view
should have so much influence on stem cell policymaking.
The burden of proof is surely on the Government—they have
to justify why we should deploy so much effort to overcome
their objections. As long as they do not provide such a
justification, we do not have good reasons to spend so much
time and effort in finding a complex compromise solution for
that group of people, certainly not if we know that this delays
the development of life saving treatments for thousands
(perhaps millions) of people. As James Childress has stated
with regard to US stem cell policy: ‘‘an ethical public policy in
our pluralistic society has to respect diverse fundamental
beliefs. And yet it must not be held hostage to any single view
of embryonic life’’.32 Tolerance should not go in one direction
only. A minority, however vocal or vehement, should not
close down important options for their fellow citizens,
certainly not when it concerns access to life saving therapies.
But the problem goes beyond the problem of majority versus
minority. Freedom of research and freedom to pursue
therapeutic options are important rights and moral values
in a democracy. Of course, scientific freedom clearly has
limits. Safety and respect for research participants takes
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precedence over the research agenda. However, in the context
of ES cell research, the application of the widely accepted
principle of freedom of research depends greatly on the moral
status of the embryo. A justification primarily based on a
contested value is insufficient to restrict scientific freedom to
such an extent. We should start to look for other ways to
show respect to other people’s fundamental beliefs on the
moral status of embryos, for example by not forcing them to
benefit from treatments based on embryo research or
products derived from embryos.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL FOR A HAPPY MEDIUM
As Hurlbut has stated in his paper: ‘‘there is a consensus
opinion in the scientific community that without NIH
support for newly created ES cell lines progress in this
important realm of research will be severely constrained’’.16
Many scientists also claim that spare IVF embryos, although
a valuable source, may not be sufficient to reach the intended
goals of stem cell research. For some purposes it would be
necessary to create new embryos solely for research, for
example, for the study of gene and chromosomal disorders
and of cell differentiation.11 19 (Ian Wilmut and his team at
the Roslin Institute recently received a licence to create
cloned human embryos to produce stem cells for studying
motor neurone disease. This cannot be done as efficiently
with any other type of stem cell at the moment.)
Hurlbut stated during the meeting that a purely political
solution will leave the country bitterly divided. This prompted
him to look for a scientific solution of the moral dilemma.
But can science alone bridge the gap between ethics and
politics? I have tried to show that his compromise proposal
might raise the same moral issues and disagreements as the
use of stem cells from embryos, so that its intended function
as a good compromise is unlikely to be realised. This is
particularly the case when taking into account that the
discussion and the research on the feasibility of ANT will
severely postpone progress in the important area of ES cell
research. The group for which Hurlbut’s compromise is
intended—if they are consistent in their beliefs—cannot be
satisfied with any compromise on the derivation of stem cells
from entities that are the beginning of human life! They can
only support stem cell sources of an unambiguous moral
status, such as adult stem cells. They can also not accept that
some embryos will be sacrificed for research in the use of a
technique that does not require the killing of embryos.
The group for which the Landry-Zucker proposal is
intended, accepts IVF. I have argued that if they accept IVF,
they accept the sacrifice of embryos for helping infertile
people. This is a viewpoint shared by those who believe the
embryo should get the same protection as persons. The
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith states that
‘‘the good intention of creating a child is not sufficient for
making a positive moral evaluation of in vitro fertilization’’,
especially because the standard by ‘‘which it is regularly
practiced … involves the destruction of human beings’’.33 If
people accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos for the
benefit of infertile people, they have no good reason not to
accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos for the benefit of
people in need of treatments based on stem cell research—
and I believe that this also implies that (under certain
conditions) they also accept the creation of embryos for
research purposes.
One argument against this statement is that there actually
is a moral difference between using spare IVF embryos and
embryos especially created for research, because the latter
have no chance of developing into a person, whereas embryos
created for the purpose of IVF do have that chance.
The compromise that might satisfy people who use this
argument—if they are consistent in their beliefs—and which
also might be a very efficient and less complex way to reach
the intended research goals, is to create embryos solely for
research purposes and to take a random selection of the same
percentage of spare IVF embryos that become a human from
the research embryos and donate them to infertile couples
who need a donor embryo. The percentage of ‘‘research
embryos’’ that becomes a human would then be the same as
that of the ‘‘spare embryos’’ that do so.12 34 Consequently,
they would have had the same chance of becoming a person.
What objections could people who accept IVF have to this
compromise solution? Moreover, this compromise would
conserve more time and energy than both proposals put to
the PCBE.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that neither the Landry-Zucker proposal nor
the Hurlbut proposal can hold good as a compromise
solution. The world seems to divide into those who think
the embryo should be protected at any price—and who,
consequently oppose IVF and embryo research—and those
who think the embryo may deserve respect but lacks ultimate
value and that the respect due to it can be weighed up against
other values, such as the needs of people who seek genetically
related children or the needs of people for stem cell
treatments. The latter group’s values revealed through their
actions, the acceptance of IVF, would be in accordance with
the compromise I have proposed here: a compromise which
would be more efficient, energy and money sparing, and
which will be the fastest way to make progress in the
‘‘important realm’’ of stem cell research. I have also argued
that if a government does not take into account the minority
views about the protection of human life in the context of
contraception, abortion, and IVF, they have no sound
justification for adapting stem cell policy to minority views
on protection of human life in the ES cell debate. Moreover, a
minority view should not close down important options for
their fellow citizens, certainly when these concern access to
life saving therapies. Freedom of research is a fundamental
principle and should not be restrained on the basis of a highly
contested value. The best way to pass the stumbling block in
stem cell policymaking is to recognise that most people
accord a gradual and variable moral status to the early
human embryo and accept its sacrifice for purposes con-
sidered to be of the highest importance, such as the
alleviation of human suffering through the development of
therapies—purposes that are as vital and important as
contraception, abortion, and IVF. Respect for the views of
minorities can be shown by not forcing upon them
treatments that they find unethical. ;
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